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Introduction
The lack of a clear successor to Xi Jinping among the members of thePolitburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)announced in October 2017 was a fitting end to the administration’s
first five years (see the article by Dimitar Gueorguiev in this issue). With Xi
already established as China’s “core leader,” the 19th National Party
Congress enshrined his political thought, his signature Belt and Road Initia-
tive, and his supply side structural reform approach in the Party Constitu-
tion. Popular comparisons of Xi and Mao Zedong have become
commonplace. Both men are portrayed as exceptionally powerful individual
leaders, willing to embrace the personalised use of authority, and deeply
committed to the Party as a force in political and daily life. And like Mao,
Xi has shown he is willing to rewrite the rules and norms of Chinese politics,
most recently by amending China’s constitution in March 2018 to eliminate
term limits for the positions of president and vice president. Yet analysis of
how Xi and his administration have successfully consolidated authority over
China’s politics and economy must be grounded in close study of the struc-
ture and functioning of the country’s political system. In this article, I in-
vestigate the Xi regime’s recentralisation of authority in the critical realm
of China’s state-owned economy. 
Despite the Hu Jintao administration’s early efforts to strengthen central
authority over the state sector, Hu’s time in office ultimately became a pe-
riod in which state-owned enterprises grew more politically influential and
difficult to monitor. Many state firms and their leaders became increasingly
autonomous from the central government in practice, even where this au-
tonomy was not enshrined in policy (Xu 2016; Xu 2018). In 2003, the in-
coming Hu administration attempted to bolster central authority by
establishing the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Com-
mission (guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui 国有资产监督管理委员
会 – SASAC) and authorising it to administer an initial portfolio of 189 cen-
tral state-owned enterprises. (1) The National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) also played a growing role in governing the state sec-
tor through its authority over domestic infrastructure spending and ap-
provals for outbound investments, both of which increased dramatically
after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
However, as the 2000s went on, SASAC’s efforts to corporatise and mar-
ketise state firms faltered on state firms’ recalcitrance and greater involve-
ment by the Central Organisation Department, which had grown concerned
with declining Party authority. Just as importantly, rapid growth in state-
owned enterprises’ size, complexity, and global reach throughout the 2000s
simply outstripped the central government’s monitoring capacity. The av-
erage number of central state-owned enterprise subsidiaries, for example,
more than doubled from 82 in 2003 to 191 in 2010 (Hsieh and Zheng 2015:
21). As SASAC found itself unable to rein in state-owned enterprises’ empire
building at home, the NDRC struggled to supervise their shopping spree in
energy and natural resources overseas. 
Facing this situation, the Xi administration has utilised and also enhanced
four existing governance mechanisms and techniques to reclaim authority
over China’s state-owned enterprises and the reform process. Specifically,
these governance mechanisms and techniques are: central leading small
groups, the cadre management system, Party committees, and campaigns.
First, by creating new central leading small groups and empowering their
staff offices to direct policy coordination and formulation, the Xi adminis-
tration weakened the authority of other actors engaged in state-owned en-
terprise reform, most notably SASAC and the NDRC. The regime also used
the cadre management system and its practices—in particular leadership
rotation and joint appointments—to shake up enterprise management and
increase Party control over the largest and most strategically important
state firms. In addition, the Xi administration strengthened Party commit-
tees’ leadership role in the governance of state-owned enterprises through
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1. Prior to SASAC’s establishment, multiple Party and government bodies shared authority for state-
owned enterprise affairs, including: the Central Planning Commission, the Ministry of Labor and
Social Security, the Ministry of Finance, the State Council’s Inspector’s Office, the Organization
and Personnel Departments, the Central Work Committee for Large Enterprises, and the State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission.
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high-level statements and changes to corporate charters and the Party Con-
stitution. Finally, the new leadership launched a far-reaching anti-corruption
campaign in which the state sector was a top focus. I reach these findings
through analysis of policy documents and an original dataset on central
state-owned enterprise leaders.
Research on the shifting locus of central authority in China often concen-
trates on formal changes in decision-making authority for personnel ap-
pointment, resource allocation, and policy-making and implementation.
Such changes include the extension or withdrawal of authority for a par-
ticular issue area among different levels of government. These formal mod-
ifications also encompass the creation, modification, or elimination of rules,
governance mechanisms, and techniques in a given policy domain. For in-
stance, scholars might investigate new regulations in a particular area, such
as environmental or fiscal policy, or even entirely redesigned institutional
arrangements, such as experiments with participatory budgeting (He and
Warren 2017; Yan and Xin 2016; Ye 2018). 
In contrast, this article emphasises that the recentralisation of authority
can also occur by altering actual practice—changing how existing gover-
nance mechanisms operate by taking advantage of the discretion that is
often built into formal institutions. For example, the Party centre may use
its longstanding power of personnel appointment to deliberately place of-
ficials with stronger ties to central-level government and Party organs in
wealthier provinces with larger private sectors and greater openness to for-
eign capital (Huang 2006). Since formal analysis of institutional mecha-
nisms cannot reveal practices such as installing selected personnel in key
posts, empirical analysis of how governance mechanisms actually func-
tion—across bureaucratic units and over time—is essential in order to un-
derstand the Chinese leadership’s evolving strategies of control. 
Multiple factors make the state-owned economy a critical site in which
to analyse the Xi administration’s governance. The first factor is the state-
owned economy’s enduring material and ideological importance in China.
State-owned enterprises’ contribution to gross industrial output has been
estimated at between 25 percent and 30 percent as of the mid-2010s, and
their share of fixed-assets investment has actually been rising since 2012
after decades of decline (Lardy 2014). (2) In addition, the sheer size and global
expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises mean that how China’s lead-
ership governs the state sector impacts markets, local communities, and
the environment worldwide. China’s “national champions” are among the
world’s largest firms by revenue—67 companies owned by the central gov-
ernment ranked on the 2017 Fortune Global 500 list—and hold 6 trillion
yuan (904 billion USD) in assets in more than 185 countries as of 2017. (3)
Finally, since state-owned enterprises embody the nexus between the gov-
ernment and the economy, state sector reform provides a lens on a range
of broader governance issues, such as changing ideas about the state’s role
in the economy, the ends and means of state influence, and the shifting
balance between political control and market liberalisation. 
This article contributes to scholarship on adaptive authoritarian gover-
nance and economic reform in China in several ways. First, it stresses that
administrations can consolidate central authority through existing gover-
nance mechanisms and techniques, not only by creating, modifying, or elim-
inating institutions and rules. The second contribution is that the piece
analyses empirically whether different administrations employ these instru-
ments in divergent ways in order to increase central government control.
In doing so, it goes beyond formal, theoretical analysis of particular institu-
tional mechanisms and techniques, such as the cadre management system’s
function of integrating fragmented government bureaucracies or that sys-
tem’s role in fostering competition among local officials (Brødsgaard 2012;
Brødsgaard 2016; Chen 2016; Landry 2008; Zhou 2018). Finally, unlike schol-
arship that emphasises institutional entrepreneurship or institutional origins,
this article highlights institutional flexibility—how existing mechanisms
and techniques of governance in a particular policy area can yield divergent
empirical outcomes in the hands of different administrations (Heilmann
and Perry 2011; Jin and Tsai 2011; Li, Feng, and Jiang 2006).
Central state-owned enterprises
This study focuses on the non-financial state firms owned by China’s central
government (zhongyang guoyou qiye 中央国有企业) and administered by
SASAC. At the end of 2017, there were 97 such firms. (4) Central state-owned
enterprises are concentrated in strategically important industries with limited
competition, such as defence, electricity, petroleum, and telecommunications
(Hsueh 2011). (5) But they also operate in more commercially-oriented and
competitive industrial sectors, ranging from automobiles to metals to elec-
tronics. Central state-owned enterprises have long been key players in China’s
domestic industrialisation and industrial policy. Today they also play a leading
role in economic statecraft abroad, most notably in the Xi administration’s
Belt and Road Initiative to advance infrastructure connectivity and economic
development across regions from Central Asia to Africa. 
Central state-owned enterprises are officially separated into two groups
based on their size and strategic importance. The first group is a batch of
“core” firms termed “important backbone state-owned enterprises”
(zhongyao gugan guoyou qiye 重要骨干国有企业). This set includes China’s
largest and best-known state firms, such as State Grid, China National
Petroleum Corporation, and Sinopec. There were 53 core central state-
owned enterprises at the start of Xi’s leadership term in 2012 (Brødsgaard
2012). (6) The second group, comprising the remaining central state-owned
enterprises, is more diverse. It includes a mix of global industry leaders,
lesser-known industrial conglomerates, and state-run research and design
institutes. Due to this variation in size and strategic importance, central
state-owned enterprises and their leaders have different formal adminis-
trative standing: those in the first group have the equivalent of vice-minis-
terial ranking (fubuji 副部级 ) and those in the second one possess the
equivalent of department-level ranking (zhengtingji 正厅级). 
Central state-owned enterprises are typically structured as large enterprise
groups (qiye jituan 企业集团). At the apex of each enterprise group is a state
holding company wholly owned by SASAC. Below this is a multi-layered
and often opaque constellation of as many as 100 to 200 member compa-
nies, including joint venture firms, research institutes, finance companies,
and other bodies. Each member company may itself have subsidiary com-
panies or hold stakes in multiple other enterprises (Milhaupt and Lin 2013).
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2. Gavekal Dragonomics, “The State of the State Sector,” Research Report, March 2017.
3. “Overseas Assets Held by China’s Centrally owned Firms Top 6 Trillion Yuan,” Reuters, 18 October
2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-congress-soes/overseas-assets-held-by-chinas-cen-
trally-owned-firms-top-6-trillion-yuan-idUKKBN1CN1EN (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
4. A list of these central state-owned enterprises is available on SASAC’s website, http://www.sasac
.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
5. In 2006, the State Council designated seven industries where the state will keep “absolute control”
(defence, electricity, petroleum, telecommunications, coal, aviation, and shipping) and nine in-
dustries where the state will maintain “strong influence” (machinery, electronics, information
technology, automobiles, steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, and construction).
6. See Brødsgaard (2012) for a list of the core 53 central state-owned enterprises. The number of
core firms has since decreased slightly due to ongoing mergers among them. 
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Within a single central state-owned enterprise, its member companies may
vary significantly in their size, performance, industry focus, and geographic
location of operations (Leutert 2016). The following analysis addresses how
the Xi administration has governed these central state-owned enterprises,
and the state-owned economy more broadly, during its first term.
Reclaiming central authority under Xi
Central leading small groups
When Xi assumed leadership in 2012, he faced the aftermath of a decade
of rapid expansion and weak internal discipline in the state sector. The first
way in which his administration has reclaimed central authority is by ex-
tending the existing governance mechanism of central leading small groups
(zhongyang lingdao xiaozu 中央领导小组), especially those associated with
Party bodies, deeper into the economic realm. Leading small groups are
supra-ministerial, extra-constitutional organisations that bring together
high-ranking officials from the government agencies, Party organs, and/or
the military who are involved in decision-making for particular policy areas
(Heilmann 2017). (7) Leading small groups are a long-standing governance
mechanism in China present at all levels of Party and government organi-
sation (Grünberg 2015; Hamrin 1992; Miller 2008; Zhou 2010; Zhou 2015). 
In theory, by convening officials from same-ranked bureaucratic units under
a higher authority, leading small groups serve as an institutional mechanism
for negotiation and decision-making by breaking stalemates among relevant
players. This function is especially important when reform policies signifi-
cantly alter existing allocations of resources and authority (Grünberg 2016).
At the central level, leading small groups’ staff offices further support this
function by preparing independent assessments based on input from group
members and by commissioning research from government-affiliated think
tanks (Heilmann 2017). The Chinese leadership may charge these groups
with carrying out broad, strategic policy mandates or more specific, issue-
oriented objectives; they may be permanent (changshe xing 常设型) or term-
based in nature (jieduan xing 阶段型) (Grünberg 2015; Zhou 2010). 
During the Hu administration, central leading small groups did not play a
major role either in making policy or in coordinating state-owned enterprise
reform. Instead, Hu intended for the newly-created SASAC to take the lead
with the NDRC playing a supporting role. SASAC’s full ministerial rank and
relatively large personnel allocation reflected the authority originally vested
in it to guide future state-owned enterprise reform. Under Hu, the NDRC
also participated in reshaping the state sector by coordinating among state-
owned enterprises and mediating their disputes, especially in electricity and
coal, and by supervising state firms’ overseas investments. The only cen-
tral-level leading small group responsible for economic matters—the Cen-
tral Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs—served more as a
body for deliberation on economic strategy and crisis management than it
did as a key player tasked with advancing the policy agenda in specific areas
such as state-owned enterprise reform (Miller 2008). 
In contrast, the Xi administration actively employed central leading small
groups to direct state-owned enterprise reform during its first term. In 2013, the
regime created the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Re-
forms (zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu 中央全面深化改革
领导小组), which Xi himself chaired. This body had a specialised subgroup for
Economic System and Ecological Civilisation System Reform (jingji tizhi he
shengtai wenming tizhi gaige 经济体制和生态文明体制改革), which senior eco-
nomic bureaucrats Liu He and Xu Shaoshi jointly chaired. In practice, the staff
office for daily operations of the pre-existing Central Leading Group on Financial
and Economic Affairs functioned during Xi’s first five years as the de facto head-
quarters of the Economic System sub-group (Naughton 2014). (8)
This staff office, headed by Liu He, became the highest authority for coordi-
nating with relevant players to create a state-owned enterprise reform
roadmap under the aegis of Xi’s “top-level design” (dingceng sheji 顶层设计).
Its assumption of this role reduced the authority of previously powerful bodies
such as the NDRC and SASAC, which was further weakened by the removal
of its head Jiang Jiemin on corruption charges in 2013. In a “push and seize”
approach, central leading small groups aimed to make major policy advances
while minimising the influence of other actors who would have benefited from
maintaining the status quo (Heilmann and Perry 2011). On paper, a flurry of
activity has occurred: during the first five years of the Xi administration, the
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms met 38 times
and approved 12 policy documents related to state-owned enterprise reform.(9)
However, the limits of using central leading small groups to advance
state-owned enterprise reform are increasingly apparent. The first of these
constraints is that while broad, consensus-based decision-making can ef-
fectively integrate information and views from multiple stakeholders,
these stakeholders continue to advocate for their own particularistic in-
terests, dragging out the policy-making process and potentially diluting
its products. For example, the first major policy deliverable of the Central
Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and its Economic
Reform subgroup, the “Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China and the State Council on Deepening the Re-
form of State-Owned Enterprises” (zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan
guanyu shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yijian 中共中央、国务院关
于深化国有企业改革的指导意见), was delayed repeatedly. Upon release
in September 2015, the “Guiding Opinions” drew criticism by some as
lacking a vision for transformative change, being unclear about action
points, and not specifying a timeline for next steps. (10) A second limitation
is that the strength of leading small groups as supra-ministerial coordi-
nating mechanisms during the policy-making stage becomes a source of
weakness during policy implementation. This is because implementation
ultimately relies on the very bureaucratic entities that leading small
groups were originally set up to circumvent. The last but not least pitfall
is that the Xi administration’s embrace of leading small groups to design
the reform agenda narrows the space for bottom-up experimentation and
innovation, by circumscribing potential experimentation within largely
preordained formal pilot programs. 
Cadre management system
The next mechanism by which the Xi administration has reclaimed cen-
tral authority over state-owned enterprises is the cadre management sys-
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7. As Heilmann (2017) observes, the extra-constitutional nature of leading small groups is manifest
in their inability to issue formal Party or government documents in their own names; instead,
they must use the formal authority of the Politburo and/or the State Council. 
8. The Xi administration also established parallel leading small groups charged with deepening reform
of the state sector in the State Council and SASAC. 
9. A full list of these documents is available from the author upon request. 
10. For a critical view of the “Guiding Opinions,” see Sheng Hong, “我为什么否定这次’国企改革’?”
(Wo weishenme fouding zheci ‘guoqi gaige’? Why do I reject this round of state-owned enterprise
reform?), Unirule Institute of Economics, 15 September 2015, http://blog.caijing.com.cn/
expert_article-151259-86280.shtml (accessed on 1 May 2018).
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tem. Heads of China’s central state-owned enterprises are not simply cor-
porate executives; they are also government officials appointed, trans-
ferred, and removed by the Party-state (Brødsgaard 2012; Chen 2015;
Leutert 2018). The Central Organisation Department, in consultation with
higher Party authorities, appoints the top executives for the core central
state-owned enterprises. Specifically, these positions are: Party committee
secretary (dangwei shuji 党委书记), general manager (zongjingli 总经理)
or president (zongcai 总裁), and chair of the board of directors (dong-
shizhang 董事长), if one exists. Using original data on the leaders of China’s
core central state-owned enterprises, I find that the Xi regime has used
two of the cadre management system’s tactics—joint appointment and
leadership rotation—in a somewhat different manner from the preceding
regime. (11)
Joint appointments among central state-owned enterprise leaders—in
which an individual holds two or more of the top three executive positions
simultaneously—are an important yet under-theorised means of central
control. (12) These appointments function as a mechanism to centralise au-
thority because consolidating decision-making power in the hands of a
smaller number of individuals, or even of a single individual, simplifies the
chain of command between the Party-state and central state-owned en-
terprises. In effect, this practice reduces the number of organisation-level
veto points to superiors’ directives. Such joint appointments between top
managerial and Party positions, which dissolve the division of labour and
implicit separation between commercial and political affairs, can also be
seen as a way to restrict managerial independence by bringing enterprise
managers firmly into the political realm. Analysing the incidence of joint
appointments can thus illuminate changes in the Party centre’s exercise
of authority over state-owned enterprises, with higher incidence of joint
appointments indicating greater centralisation of authority. 
Leadership rotation—when the head of one central state-owned enter-
prise is appointed directly to a top executive position in another—is another
key mechanism of central control over state-owned enterprises. (13) The
Party centre can use this tactic to shake up existing leadership teams and
to limit the potential risk of departmentalism (benweizhuyi 本位主义), a
phenomenon in which long-serving individuals in specialised bureaucracies
come to evaluate policy priorities from the perspective and interests of their
own organisations (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Rotating the top ex-
ecutives of state firms in a particular industry limits their ability to develop
deep personal networks and autonomous bases of influence in their enter-
prises. The Party centre can also use leadership rotation as a step in an anti-
corruption investigation, because moving an executive from one state firm
to another can help to facilitate scrutiny of potential illicit behaviour in the
original firm. (14) Higher frequency of leadership rotation thus suggests an
increase in central control over state-owned enterprises. 
Drawing on an original dataset on China’s central state-owned enterprise
leaders, I find that the Xi administration has used both joint appointments
and leadership rotation to recentralise its authority relative to the Hu ad-
ministration. (15) First, the data show that the incidence of joint appoint-
ments combining two or more of the top three executive positions in the
core central state-owned enterprises has increased under Xi. The average
incidence of any combination of joint appointments during the first term
of the Xi administration (2013–2017) was 89%, up from 76% during the
Hu administration (2003–2012). 
In addition, the specific leadership roles that joint appointments combine
have varied between the Hu and Xi administrations (see Figure 1 below).
By the end of Xi’s first term in 2017, the percentage of China’s core central
state-owned enterprises led by leaders serving simultaneously as board
chairman and Party secretary topped 90%. The dominance of board chair-
man–Party secretary joint appointments during the Xi administration di-
verges from the Hu regime, when the general manager–Party secretary
pairing was prevalent and the board chairman–Party secretary combination
was also common but less frequent. A key reason for this difference is the
fact that many core central state-owned enterprises did not establish boards
of directors at the holding company level until the early 2010s. Increase in
the incidence of joint appointments combining the board chairman and
Party secretary positions under Xi thus reflects a dual ambition to develop
formal corporate governance institutions in the core central state-owned
enterprises—and to ensure the Party’s leadership role within them. 
The Xi administration also significantly increased the frequency of lead-
ership rotation among China’s core central state-owned enterprises. Dur-
ing the decade-long Hu administration, 14 transfers of top executives
from one core central state-owned enterprise to another took place, with
leadership rotation occurring at an average rate of 1.4 transfers per year.
In contrast, 19 such transfers have already taken place during only the
first five years of the Xi administration, with the average rate of leadership
rotation more than doubling to reach 3.8 transfers per year (see the Ap-
pendix for a detailed list of transfers). This increase suggests that the Party
centre under Xi is taking a more hands-on approach to managing person-
nel affairs in China’s largest and most strategically important state firms. 
Party committees
The third way in which the Xi administration has recentralised its authority
over state-owned enterprises is by strengthening Party committees’ role in
corporate governance. In 1999, the top leadership under Jiang Zemin man-
dated that state firms establish “an effective corporate governance structure”
(youxiao de faren zhili jiegou 有效的法人治理结构)—the first time that the
term “corporate governance” appeared in an official document. (16) State-
owned enterprises began to set up the “new three committees” (xin san hui
新三会) at the holding company level: the board of directors, the supervisory
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11. In this section’s empirical analysis, I only examine core central state-owned enterprises and their
leaders, rather than both core and non-core central state-owned enterprises and their leaders.
Pooling these two sets of firms and their leaders together for analysis is not advisable because
different bodies appoint their heads. The Central Organization Department appoints the heads of
the core central state-owned enterprises in conjunction with higher Party authorities, whereas
SASAC appoints the heads of the non-core central state-owned enterprises. 
12. There are four possible types of joint appointments combining the top three executive positions:
general manager–Party secretary, board chairman–Party secretary, general manager–board chair-
man, and general manager–Party secretary–board chairman. 
13. In addition to the centralisation of authority, leadership rotation can also serve other aims, such
as facilitating the planned consolidation of state-owned enterprises in a particular sector or fos-
tering organisational learning.
14. For example, this was the case with Chang Xiaobing, who was rotated from China Unicom to
China Telecom while under investigation for corruption and who served there briefly until his
arrest in December 2015. 
15. This database covers the period between 2003 and 2017 and includes information on central
state-owned enterprise leaders’ leadership rotation and joint appointments compiled from their
official CVs, which were available on company websites or publicly online; the Chinese Political
Elites database hosted by National Chengchi University; and official Chinese media reports. I
choose 2003 as the starting point because SASAC was established in that year; 2017 marks the
endpoint of Xi’s first leadership term.
16. The Chinese term initially used for corporate governance was “faren zhili jiegou 法人治理结构”;
later it was commonly referred to as “gongsi zhili zhidu 公司治理制度” or “gongsi zhidu 公司制
度.” Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, “中共中央关于国有企业改革和发
展若干重大问题的决定” (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu guoyou qiye gaige he fazhan ruogan
zhongda wenti de jueding, Decision on major issues concerning the reform and development of
state-owned enterprises), 22 September 1999.
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committee, and the shareholders meeting. (17) The objective was to increase
operational efficiency through an implied division of labour between state-
owned enterprises’ political, social, and personnel affairs, which Party com-
mittees would continue to manage, and their commercial affairs, which the
board of directors and supervisory committee would lead with shareholder
input. These steps to develop corporate governance expanded enterprise man-
agers’ autonomy for company decision-making relative to central-level gov-
ernment and Party authorities, even if this independence remained limited. 
The Xi administration has bolstered existing Party committees’ role in cor-
porate governance in two complementary ways. The first is high-level state-
ments affirming Party committees’ leadership role and authority to
participate in “major decisions” involving state-owned enterprises’ opera-
tions, personnel affairs, investment, and spending. In May 2016, for example,
SASAC’s Party Committee published an article in a leading Party journal
stating that major decisions must be first discussed by the Party commit-
tees of state-owned enterprises before being decided by their boards of di-
rectors. (18) In October 2016, Xi Jinping personally addressed a national
meeting on Party building in state-owned enterprises and emphasised that
Party organisations should serve a “leadership core” function as well as a
“political core” function in state firms. (19)
The second way in which the Xi regime has increased Party committees’
influence in the governance of state-owned enterprises is by institutional-
ising their leadership role. In January 2017, SASAC ordered central state-
owned enterprises to revise their corporate charters to formalise
requirements for Party-building work and the Party committee’s part in cor-
porate governance. (20) In September 2017, SASAC announced that all of the
then 98 central state-owned enterprises under its supervision had imple-
mented this change. (21) The Xi administration further enshrined the Party
committee’s authority to “play a leadership role” (fahui lingdao zuoyong 发
挥领导作用) in state-owned enterprise decision-making by adding this
phrase to the Party Constitution at the 19th Party Congress in October
2017. 
While affirming and formalising Party committees’ influence in state-
owned enterprises sends a powerful signal of central authority, it does entail
several real-world costs. First, bolstering the Party’s leadership role risks un-
dermining the Xi regime’s “mixed ownership” strategy for state-owned en-
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17. The “old three committees” (lao san hui 老三会) referred to the Party committee, workers rep-
resentative assembly, and workers union. 
18. SASAC Party Committee, “在全面深化国有企业改革中加强党的建设工作” (Zai quanmian
shenhua guoyou qiye gaige zhong jiaqiang dang de jianshe gongzuo, Strengthening Party building
work in the process of comprehensively deepening state-owned enterprise reform), Qiushi (Seek-
ing Truth), 31 May 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-05/31/c_1118938354.htm (ac-
cessed on 1 May 2018). 
19. “习近平在全国国有企业党的建设工作会议上强调:坚持党对国企的领导不动摇” (Xi Jin-
ping zai quanguo guoyou qiye dang de jianshe gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao: jianchi dang dui
guoqi de lingdao bu dongyao, Xi Jinping stressed at the national state-owned enterprise Party-
building work conference: insistence on the Party’s leadership of state-owned enterprises is un-
shakable), Xinhua News, 11 October 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2016-10/11/c_1119
697415.htm (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
20. SASAC, “关于加快推进中央企业党建工作总体要求纳入公司章程有关事项的通知”
(Guanyu jiakuai tuijin zhongyang qiye dangjian gongzuo zongti yaoqiu jieru gongsi zhangcheng
youguan shixiang de tongzhi, Notice on matters regarding speeding up and advancing the inclu-
sion of overall requirements for central state-owned enterprises’ Party-building work in corporate
charters), 3 January 2017.
21. “国资委：要吸引各种所有制企业参与国企改革” (Guoziwei: yao xiyin ge zhong suoyouzhi
qiye canyu guoqi gaige, SASAC: Enterprises of all ownership types should be attracted to partic-
ipate in state-owned enterprise reform), Southern Weekly, 29 September 2017,
http://www.infzm.com/content/129480 (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
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terprise reform. (22) Buy-in from the private sector is essential for “mixed
ownership” to succeed. But many potential investors remain sceptical that
their interests as minority shareholders will be protected, despite existing
formal guarantees in state-owned enterprises’ corporate charters (Lin and
Chang working paper). Affirming Party committees’ role in company deci-
sion-making will further exacerbate private firms’ wariness, because it un-
derscores the state’s willingness to subordinate commercial objectives, such
as profit maximisation, to political imperatives, such as stability or employ-
ment. More broadly, formalising Party committees’ “leadership role” in cor-
porate governance has reputational costs, especially for state-owned
enterprises operating overseas. Amid rising concern in capitals around the
world about Chinese state-owned enterprises’ foreign investments, this
move is likely to heighten perceptions that these companies are directed
and supported by the state. 
Campaigns
The final means by which the Xi administration has recentralised authority
over state-owned enterprises and the reform process is its use of campaigns.
Campaigns differ from central leading small groups, the cadre management
system, and Party committees because they are a technique rather than a
mechanism of governance. Employed widely during the Mao era and con-
tinuing in use thereafter, campaigns leverage high levels of bureaucratic and
citizen mobilisation to transform existing organisations and practices in a
particular policy area (Looney 2012). Campaigns vary along multiple di-
mensions: their objectives, their scope (the number, administrative ranking,
and geographic location of the organisations or individuals targeted), their
duration, and the severity of the punishments they mete out.
The “managed campaigns” of the reform era can serve to centralise Chi-
nese leaders’ authority in several ways (Perry 2011). In the short term, this
governance technique mobilises mass participation and resources toward
goals that leaders determine, shaking up the status quo in the process. Lead-
ers can also use campaigns to target and facilitate the removal of individuals
perceived to be their present or potential future political adversaries, and
to promote political allies in their place. In the long term, these mobilisa-
tions can also bolster central authority by demanding loyalty and increasing
pressure for ideological conformity. 
The far-reaching anti-corruption campaign that Xi launched in 2012 after
assuming leadership has become a key hallmark of his rule. Central state-
owned enterprises, notorious for their weak oversight and byzantine organ-
isational structures, quickly found themselves in the crosshairs of Xi’s
anti-corruption drive. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
(CCDI) carried out three successive waves of anti-graft inspections targeting
the core central state-owned enterprises—at 2 firms in 2013, 10 firms in
2014, and 43 firms in 2015—before it reported this phase of the campaign
officially complete in 2016. (23) By the end of Xi’s first five years in office, 12
top executives of the core central state-owned enterprises had fallen on
corruption charges. (24)
In contrast, the Hu administration’s efforts to combat corruption were
narrow in scope, ranked lower among official priorities, and were typi-
cally amalgamated into broader Party building initiatives. (25) During
the Hu regime, the CCDI was not the muscular political and policy actor
that it would later become under Xi. While anti-corruption featured
regularly in official reports and remained a key component of Party ed-
ucation in the Hu years, there were no far-reaching, coordinated cam-
paigns focused primarily on this issue. Only two top executives of the
core central state-owned enterprises were officially removed on cor-
ruption charges under Hu—far fewer than the 12 top executives re-
moved under Xi. (26)
But while campaigns can deliver rapid change and even catalyse broader
transformation in a particular policy area, their utility is ultimately restricted.
Since Xi’s anti-corruption campaign operates outside existing systems of
governance in SASAC and central state-owned enterprises, it has limited abil-
ity to facilitate the structural changes essential for genuine long-term im-
provement in areas like auditing and information reporting and transparency.
In addition, the uncertainty and fear that campaigns induce can disrupt or
even paralyse enterprise operations, as individuals seek to avoid mistakes or
worry about punishment for past actions that were previously condoned but
that are now targeted. While the stress that campaigns deliberately cause
can help to weaken resistance to their policy aims and promote self-moni-
toring in the short term, this atmosphere cannot be sustained in the long
term without impacting operational efficiency and incurring significant psy-
chological and physical costs for individuals (Mertha 2017). 
Conclusion
A recentralisation of policy-making, personnel, and Party authority has
characterised the Xi Jinping administration’s governance of the state-owned
economy. Through analysis of policy documents and an original dataset on
central state-owned enterprise leaders, this article identified four existing
governance mechanisms and techniques that the Xi administration has used
to consolidate central control. By expanding central leading small groups
deeper into the economic realm and empowering their staff offices to direct
policy-making, the Xi administration weakened the authority of other actors
engaged in state-owned enterprise affairs and state sector reform. Through
leadership rotation, joint appointments, and strengthening existing Party
committees, it succeeded in shaking up firm management and increasing
Party control over corporate governance. Last but certainly not least, the
Xi administration’s far-reaching anti-corruption campaign sent shockwaves
through the state sector and felled numerous top executives. Instead of as-
suming that authority can only be recentralised through reconfiguring net-
works of the ruling elite or by creating, modifying, or eliminating institutions
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22. “Mixed ownership” refers to the diversification of state-owned enterprises’ shareholding structures
through publicly listing a proportion of state-owned enterprises’ assets, selling a portion of state
shares to the private sector, and/or granting employees stock ownership. 
23. “中央纪委监察部网站已发布央企被查领导64人” (Zhongyang jiwei jianchabu wangzhan yi
fabu yangqi bei cha lingdao 64 ren, CCDI Inspection Department website announced 64 central
state-owned enterprise leaders have been investigated), Xinhua News, 4 January 2016,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-01/04/c_1117665184.htm (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
24. They were: Song Lin (China Resources Group, 2014); Wang Shuaiting (Hong Kong China Travel
Group Co., Ltd., 2014); Sun Zhaoxue (China Aluminum Corporation, 2014); Liao Yongyuan (China
National Petroleum Corporation, 2015); Xu Jianyi (China FAW Group, 2015); Wang Tianpu (China
Petrochemical Corporation, 2015); Si Xianmin (General Manager of China Southern Airlines Group
Company, 2015); Zhu Fushou (General Manager of Dongfeng Motor Corporation, 2015); Deng
Qilin (Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation , 2016); Chang Xiaobing (China Telecom Corpo-
ration, 2016); Cai Xiyou (China Sinochem Corporation, 2016).
25. For example, “actively promoting the building of Party style and anti-corruption work” (jiji tuijin
qiye dangfeng jianshe he fanfu changlian gongzuo 积极推进企业党风建设和反腐倡廉工作)
appears as item 13 in an internal document outlining Party-building work in central state-owned
enterprises. Central Organisation Department, SASAC Party Committee, “关于加强和改进中央
企业党建工作的意见” (Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin zhongyang qiye dangjian gongzuo de yijian
Opinions on strengthening and advancing central state-owned enterprises’ Party building work),
31 October 2004.
26. Chen Tonghai (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, 2007); Kang Rixin (China National
Nuclear Corporation, 2009).
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and rules, this article reveals that administrations can achieve this aim by
using existing instruments of central control in divergent ways. 
The Xi administration’s centralisation of authority over the state sector
has concurrently negated the separation between the government and the
Party that was a key legacy of the Deng era (as the Gueorguiev article has
also discussed in this issue). By increasing board chairman–Party secretary
joint appointments and by strengthening Party committees’ leadership role
in corporate governance, the Xi regime has expanded Party authority be-
yond political and personnel affairs to encompass a broader range of en-
terprise matters. The Xi administration’s March 2018 announcement of
plans to overhaul Party, government, and legislative institutions—including
the conversion of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening
Reforms into the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission
(zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige weiyuanhui 中央全面深化改革委员
会)—suggests that the Party’s subsuming of the government is moving
steadily from de facto to de jure. (27) In the coming years, Xi’s drive to for-
malise and institutionalise Party influence—and his own ruling position—
may involve greater efforts to change China’s governance system, not only
leverage existing tools of central control. 
Yet despite the Xi administration’s moves to consolidate central control,
state-owned enterprises are not simply tools of the state. The Xi regime
has paired its recentralisation of political authority in the state-owned
economy with limited steps toward economic liberalisation. Such steps in-
clude experimentation with “mixed ownership” and state capital manage-
ment, which entails granting enterprise leaders greater autonomy for
decisions about operations and managing capital. Overseas, central state-
owned enterprises are quietly shaking off the hand of the state—commer-
cially, if not politically—by investing more of their own capital in
international markets instead of only serving as contractors or relying on
funds from state-owned banks. More unitary chains of political command
linking the Party centre and central state-owned enterprises might provide
clearer channels for political influence, but they do not necessarily equate
linear commercial control. 
Future research on the governance of China’s state-owned economy could
address three areas. First, further investigation is needed to assess whether
this article’s empirical findings concerning cadre management can be ex-
tended beyond the core central state-owned enterprises. Do similar trends
of increased leadership rotation and joint appointments also exist among
the non-core central state-owned enterprises or firms owned by lower levels
of government? A second issue for inquiry concerns specific configurations
of joint appointments. Patterns of joint appointments may vary not only
between different administrations but also among state firms in different
industries, depending on central leaders’ assessments about their “perceived
strategic value” (Hsueh 2011; Hsueh 2016). Are joint appointments between
top Party and managerial positions more widespread in central state-owned
enterprises in industries that the State Council has tapped for “absolute con-
trol” by the state than in more competitive sectors? Finally, a third question
concerns how changes to the Party’s leadership role in state-owned enter-
prises are articulated and envisioned. While all central state-owned enter-
prises have now revised their corporate charters to affirm Party committees’
leadership role, the precise language used and its potential variation across
state firms have yet to be examined. Do central state-owned enterprises’
corporate charters vary in the scope and content of the authority granted
to their Party committees? Research addressing these areas would offer ad-
ditional insight into the governance of China’s state-owned economy.
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27. “中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》” (Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ‘shenhua
dang he guojia jiguan gaige fang’an’, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China releases
“Plan to Deepen the Reform of the Party and State Institutions”), Xinhua, 21 March 2018,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-03/21/c_1122570517.htm (accessed on 1 May 2018).
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Appendix – Leadership Rotation in China’s Core Central State-owned Enterprises, 2003-2017
Year Name Company Transferred From Company Transferred To
2004 
Ning Gaoning 
宁高宁
China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd. 
Huarun ( jituan) youxian gongsi 
华润（集团）有限公司
China Oil and Foodstuffs Corp., Ltd. (COFCO)
Zhongliang jituan youxian gongsi
中粮集团有限公司
2004 
Wang Ji 
王计
Dongfeng Motor Corp.
Dongfeng qiche gongsi 
东风汽车公司
China Dongfang Electric Corp. Ltd.
Zhongguo dongfang dianqi jituan youxian gongsi
中国东方电气集团有限公司
2004 
Wang Jianzhou
王建宙
China Unicom
Zhongguo lianhe wangluo tongxin jituan youxian gongsi
中国联合网络通信集团有限公司
China Mobile 
Zhongguo yidong tongxin jituan gongsi
中国移动通信集团公司
2006 
Li Wenxin 
李文新
China Eastern Airlines Corp.
Zhongguo dongfang hangkong jituan gongsi
中国东方航空集团公司
China Southern Airlines Corp.
Zhongguo nanfang hangkong jituan gongsi
中国南方航空集团公司
2007
Wang Binghua
王炳华
China Power Investment Corp. 
Zhongguo dianli touzi jituan gongsi
中国电力投资集团公司
National Nuclear Power Technology Corp.
Guojia hedian jishu gongsi
国家核电技术公司
2008
Li Qingkui
李庆奎
China Guodian Corp.
Zhongguo guodian jituan gongsi
中国国电集团公司
China Huadian Corp.
Zhongguo huadian jituan gongsi
中国华电集团公司
2008
Cao Peixi
曹培玺
China Huadian Corp.
Zhongguo huadian jituan gongsi
中国华电集团公司
China Huaneng Group Corp.
Zhongguo huaneng jituan gongsi
中国华能集团公司
2008 
Liu Shaoyong
刘绍勇
China Southern Airlines Group
Zhongguo nanfang hangkong jituan gongsi
中国南方航空集团公司
China Eastern Airlines Corp.
Zhongguo dongfang hangkong jituan gongsi
中国东方航空集团公司
2008
Shang Bing
尚冰
China Unicom
Zhongguo lianhe wangluo tongxin jituan youxian gongsi
中国联合网络通信集团有限公司
China Telecom 
Zhongguo dianxin jituan gongsi
中国电信集团公司
2009
Xiong Weiping
熊维平
China Hong Kong China Travel Service Corp.
Zhongguo gangzhonglü jituan gongsi
中国港中旅集团公司
China Aluminum Corp.
Zhongguo lüye gongsi
中国铝业公司
2010
Hu Wenming
胡问鸣
China North Industries Group Corp.
Zhongguo bingqi gongye jituan gongsi
中国兵器工业集团公司
China State Shipbuilding Corp.
Zhongguo chuanbo gongye jituan gongsi
中国船舶工业集团公司
2011
Fu Chengyu
傅成玉
China National Offshore Oil Corp.
Zhongguo haiyang shiyou zonggongsi
中国海洋石油总公司
China Petrochemical Corp.
Zhongguo shiyou huagong jituan gongsi
中国石油化工集团公司
2011
Xiong Qunli
熊群力
China Electronics Information Industry Group Co., Ltd.
Zhongguo dianzi xinxi chanye jituan youxian gongsi
中国电子信息产业集团有限公司
China Electronics Technology Group Corp.
Zhongguo dianzi keji jituan gongsi
中国电子科技集团公司
2011
Ma Zehua
马泽华
China Shipping Group Corp. 
Zhongguo haiyun ( jituan) zonggongsi
中国海运（集团）总公司
China Ocean Shipping Group Corp.
Zhongguo yuanyang yunshu ( jituan) zonggongsi
中国远洋运输（集团）总公司
2014
Fu Yuning
傅育宁
China Merchants Group Co., Ltd.
Zhaoshangju jituan youxian gongsi
招商局集团有限公司
China Resources (Holdings) Co. Ltd.
Huarun ( jituan) youxian gongsi
华润（集团）有限公司
2014
He Wenbo
何文波
Baosteel Group Co., Ltd.
Baogang jituan youxian gongsi /
宝钢集团有限公司
China Minmetals Corp.
Zhongguo wukuang jituan gongsi
中国五矿集团公司
2015
Hu Wenming
胡问鸣
China State Shipbuilding Corp.
Zhongguo chuanbo gongye jituan gongsi
中国船舶工业集团公司
China Shipbuilding Industry Corp.
Zhongguo chuanbo zhonggong jituan gongsi
中国船舶重工集团公司
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Year Name Company Transferred From Company Transferred To
2015
Chang Xiaobing
常小兵
China Unicom
Zhongguo lianhe wangluo tongxin jituan youxian gongsi
中国联合网络通信集团有限公司
China Telecom 
Zhongguo dianxin jituan gongsi
中国电信集团公司
2015
Gu Jun
顾军
National Nuclear Power Technology Corp.
Guojia hedian jishu gongsi
国家核电技术公司
China National Nuclear Construction Corp.
Zhongguo he gongye jianshe jituan gongsi
中国核工业建设集团公司
2015
Wang Binghua
王炳华
National Nuclear Power Technology Corp.
Guojia hedian jishu gongsi
国家核电技术公司
China Power Investment Corp.
Zhongguo dianli touzi jituan gongsi
中国电力投资集团公司
2015
Wang Xiaochu
王晓初
China Telecom
Zhongguo dianxin jituan gongsi
中国电信集团公司
China Unicom
Zhongguo lianhe wangluo tongxin jituan youxian gongsi
中国联合网络通信集团有限公司
2015
Wang Yilin
王宜林
China National Offshore Oil Corp.
Zhongguo haiyang shiyou zonggongsi
中国海洋石油总公司
China National Petroleum Corp.
Zhongguo shiyou tianranqi jituan gongsi
中国石油天然气集团公司
2015
Xu Ping
徐平
Dongfeng Motor Corp.
Dongfeng qiche gongsi
东风汽车公司
China FAW Group Corp.
Zhongguo di yi qiche jituan gongsi
中国第一汽车集团公司
2016
Li Qingkui
李庆奎
China Huadian Corp.
Zhongguo huadian jituan gongsi
中国华电集团公司
China Southern Power Grid Co.
Zhongguo nanfang dianwang youxian gongsi
中国南方电网有限公司
2016
Ning Gaoning
宁高宁
China Oil and Foodstuffs Corp., Ltd. (COFCO)
Zhongliang jituan youxian gongsi
中粮集团有限公司
China Sinochem Corp., Ltd.
Zhongguo zhonghua jituan youxian gongsi
中国中化集团有限公司
2016
Si Zefu
斯泽夫
China Dongfang Electric Corp.
Zhongguo dongfang dianqi jituan youxian gongsi
中国东方电气集团有限公司
Harbin Electric Group Co.
Ha’erbin dianqi jituan gongsi
哈尔滨电气集团公司
2016
Wang Shoujun
王寿君
China National Nuclear Construction Corp.
Zhongguo he gongye jianshe jituan gongsi
中国核工业建设集团公司
China National Nuclear Corp.
Zhongguo he gongye jituan gongsi
中国核工业集团公司
2016
Xu Xianping
许宪平
China FAW Group Corp. 
Zhongguo di yi qiche jituan gongsi
中国第一汽车集团公司
China General Technology (Group) Holding Co., Ltd.
Zhongguo tongyong jishu ( jituan) konggu youxian zeren gongsi
中国通用技术（集团）控股有限责任公司
2016
Zhao Jianguo
赵建国
China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd.
Zhongguo nanfang dianwang youxian gongsi
中国南方电网有限公司
China Huadian Corp.
Zhongguo huadian jituan gongsi
中国华电集团公司
2016
Zhao Shuanglian
赵双连
China National Grain and Grain Management Corp.
Zhongguo chubei liang guanli zonggongsi 
中国储备粮管理总公司
China Oil and Foodstuffs Corp., Ltd. (COFCO)
Zhongliang jituan youxian gongsi
中粮集团有限公司
2016
Zou Lei
邹磊
Harbin Electric Group Co., Ltd.
Ha’erbin dianqi jituan gongsi
哈尔滨电气集团公司
China Dongfang Electric Corp.
Zhongguo dongfang qiche jituan youxian gongsi
中国东方电气集团有限公司
2017
Xu Liuping
徐留平
China North Industries Group Corp.
Zhongguo bingqi zhuangbei jituan gongsi
中国兵器装备集团公司
China FAW Group Corp.
Zhongguo di yi qiche jituan gongsi
中国第一汽车集团公司
2017
Xu Ping
徐平
China FAW Group Corp.
Zhongguo di yi qiche jituan gongsi
中国第一汽车集团公司
China North Industries Group Corp.
Zhongguo bingqi zhuangbei jituan gongsi
中国兵器装备集团公司
